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I. INTRODUCTION
The Constitution vests the power to issue letters of patent and copyright with
Congress.' Congress has, from time to time, passed and revised various copyright
statutes, 2 culminating with the passage of the Copyright Act of 1976 (1976 Act).3
These statutes have provided authors and artisans with some level of protection
against the unauthorized use of their expressions. A recent Supreme Court opinion, 4
not involving a copyright issue, however, threatens to open the door to the plundering
of this property right at the hands of our own elected officials.
In Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,5 a case involving eleventh amendment
immunity to federal employment discrimination laws, the Supreme Court has
encouraged the dismissal of copyright infringement actions against state actors by
allowing the states to more readily rely on the defense of eleventh amendment
immunity. In the most recent copyright cases, the lower courts have cited the
language used in Atascadero as being applicable to copyright infringement actions
against state actors. 6 In fact, one court has interpreted Atascadero as mandating
dismissal of infringement actions against state actors,7 even though it recognized that
this interpretation of Atascadero would "allow states to violate the federal copyright
laws with virtual impunity." 8 Careful analysis of the Atascadero opinion, however,
together with a review of relevant eleventh amendment immunity cases, 9 reveals a
more consistent and logical line of reasoning that will permit the lower courts to give
1. U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 [hereinafter Patent and Copyright Clause].
2. On May31, 1790, Congress passed an act "forthe encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps,
charts, and books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times therein mentioned." ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124
(1790). On April 29, 1802, the benefits of the 1790 act were extended to "arts of designing, engraving, and etching
historical and other prints." ch. 36, 2 Stat. 171 (1802).
The 1790 and 1802 acts were repealed when Congress adopted a new copyright statute on February 3, 1831. Among
other changes, the new statute extended copyright protection to musical works, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (1831). Copyright
protection was further extended to cover dramatic compositions on August 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138 (1856), and
to photographs and negatives on March 3, 1865, ch. 126, 13 Stat. 540 (1865).
Congress made its second major revision of the copyright laws on July 8, 1870. In addition to revising and
consolidating the existing copyright laws, the new act extended copyright protection to paintings, drawings, statues, and
other works of fine art, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198 (1870).
The last major revision of the copyright laws prior to the Copyright Act of 1976 was the Copyright Act of 1909, ch.
320, 35 Stat. 1075.
3. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 110-914 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
4. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., BV Eng'g v. University of Cal., Los Angeles, 657 F. Supp. 1246 (C.D. Cal. 1987), aff'd, 858 F.2d
1394 (9th Cir. 1988); Richard Anderson Photo. v. Radford Univ., 633 F. Supp. 1154 (W.D. Va. 1986), aff'd sub nom.,
Richard Anderson Photo. v. Brown, 852 F.2d 114 (4th Cir. 1988); Woelffer v. Happy States of Am., 626 F. Supp. 499
(N.D. III. 1985).
7. See, e.g., BV Eng'g v. University of Cal., Los Angeles, 858 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1988).
8. Id. at 1400.
9. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transp. Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (involving the tenth amendment);
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); In re McVey Trucking, 812 F.2d
311 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, Edgar v. McVey Trucking, 108 S. Ct. 227 (1987).
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effect to the intention of Congress to subject the individual states to suits for copyright
infringement, without upsetting the delicate balance between state and federal
powers.
This Note will focus on a discussion of the limitations placed on Congress to
abrogate the states' eleventh amendment immunity. A comparison between Con-
gress' power under the fourteenth amendment and Congress' plenary powers will
reveal that Congress can abrogate the states' eleventh amendment immunity under
any of its plenary grants of power. The Note will further argue that the lower courts
have adopted an overly restrictive reading of the Atascadero opinion and, in doing so,
are frustrating the clear intentions of Congress, leaving copyright owners without a
remedy to protect their property rights whenever the infringer is a state actor.
1"[. THE EARLY CASES
Because there are few authoritative cases dealing with the issue of sovereign
immunity' 0 to copyright infringement actions, the area has received little attention.
As a result, the courts that have recently been asked to decide this issue have had to
do so without the benefit of significant precedent.
The copyright cases prior to Atascadero show a mixed interpretation of the effect
of the eleventh amendment on copyright infringement actions. Wihtol v. Crow" was
one of the earliest cases squarely dealing with the issue of sovereign immunity to
copyright infringement actions. In Wihtol, the defendant, Crow, copied a song for
which the plaintiff, Wihtol, held a valid copyright. 2 Crow incorporated this song into
a new arrangement and then distributed copies of the derivative work to the high
school choir of the Clarinda, Iowa, School District, which he directed. 13
Wihtol brought suit against both Crow and the school district employing Crow.
The Eighth Circuit, relying on an earlier Supreme Court opinion in Ex parte New
York, 14 which dealt with eleventh amendment immunity, although not in a copyright
context, held that a suit against the State of Iowa for copyright infringement "clearly
could not be maintained because of the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States."' 15 Because the school district was an instrumentality of the State
of Iowa, and Wihtol was seeking a judgment that would be payable out of public
funds, the Eighth Circuit ruled that it lacked jurisdiction.16
10. "[The sovereign immunity] [d]octrine precludes [the] litigant from asserting an otherwise meritorious cause of
action against a sovereign or a party with sovereign attributes unless [the] sovereign consents to suit .. ." BLAC K's LAw
DiCTIONARY 1252 (5th ed. 1979).
The focus of this Note is the sovereign immunity doctrine as applied to the federal courts through the operation of
the eleventh amendment: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another state, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State." U.S. CONSr. amend. XI.
11. 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962), reh'g denied, (Jan. 5, 1963).
12. Id. at 778.
13. Id. at 778-79.
14. 256 U.S. 490 (1921) (In this case, involving a claim against the State of New York for damages caused by tugs
operated by the state, the Court ruled that a state could not be sued by a private citizen in federal court without the state's
consent.). Id. at 497.
15. Wihtol, 309 F.2d at 781.
16. Id. at 782.
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The Ninth Circuit, in Mills Music v. Arizona,17 considered the Wihtol opinion.
In Mills Music, the State of Arizona used a musical composition as the theme song
to the 1971 Arizona State Fair without the copyright owner's permission.' 8 In
discussing the eleventh amendment immunity defense, the court noted that the Patent
and Copyright Clause was a grant of constitutional power that places inherent
limitations on state sovereignty. Having failed to find any express intent of Congress
to subject the individual states to the penalties of the copyright statute,' 9 the court
nonetheless was convinced that the sweeping language of the statute, 20 taken in the
context of the activity being regulated and the statute's legislative history, 2' together
with the fact that Congress had made the United States subject to the statute, 22
implied that Congress had abrogated the states' eleventh amendment immunity.2 3
The District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan criticized the Mills Music
opinion in Mihalek Corporation v. Michigan.24 In Mihalek, the plaintiff alleged
copyright infringement by the State of Michigan in several elements of a tourism
campaign.25 As one defense, the state raised its eleventh amendment immunity. 26
Relying on a noncopyright case, Edelman v. Jordan,2 7 where the Supreme Court had
held that retrospective monetary damages were barred by the eleventh amendment, 28
the district court held that the eleventh amendment gave the state immunity from
money damages when the award would be paid out of the state treasury. 29 The district
court went further and stated in dicta that it felt "compelled to conclude that Mills
Music was decided incorrectly, ' 30 concluding that copyright owners did not deserve
more protection under the 1976 Act than the plaintiffs deserved in Edelman.3 l The
Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision without reaching the eleventh amendment
question. 32
Johnson v. University of Virginia33 was the final case dealing with the issue of
eleventh amendment immunity to copyright infringement to be decided prior to
17. 591 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1979), ovr'd by BV Eng'g v. University of Cal., Los Angeles, 858 F.2d 1394 (9th
Cir. 1988).
18. Mills Music, 591 F.2d at 1280.
19. Id. at 1285.
20. "The language of the statute is sweeping and without apparent limitation, suggesting that Congress intended
to include states within the class of defendants." Id. at 1285.
21. Id. at n.8.
22. "Even the United States is liable for the infringement of a copyright,... to hold that Congress did not intend
to include states within the class of defendants would lead to an anomalous construction of the statute at best." id. See
28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1982).
23. Mills Music, 591 F.2d at 1285.
24. 595 F. Supp. 903 (E.D. Mich. 1985), reh'g denied, 630 F. Supp. 9 (E.D. Mich. 1985), aff'd, 814 F.2d 290
(6th Cir. 1987).
25. Mihalek, 595 F. Supp. at 904.
26. Id. at 905.
27. 415 U.S. 651 (1974). In Edelman, the respondent alleged that the State of Illinois was administering the Aid
to the Aged, Blind, or Disabled program in a manner that violated the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 653.
28. Id. at 678.
29. Mihalek, 595 F. Supp. at 906.
30. Id. at 905.
31. Id. at 906.
32. Mihalek Corp. v. Michigan, 814 F.2d 290, 297 (6th Cir. 1987).
33. 606 F. Supp. 321 (W.D. Va. 1985).
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Atascadero. In Johnson, the plaintiff alleged infringement of several photographic
slides by the University of Virginia.3 4
The district court analyzed both the Mills Music opinion and the opinion in
Wihtol. Relying extensively on Mills Music, the district court held that the use of
sweeping language in the 1976 Act was sufficient to indicate an intent on the part of
Congress to abrogate the states' eleventh amendment immunity. 35 The district court
dismissed Wihtol as "little more than a conclusory statement that the Eleventh
Amendment bars suits against the states .... -36 This assessment was based on the
district court's conclusion that Wihtol "did not present a compelling case for
addressing the issue of whether the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity was
waived by the... 1909 [Copyright] Act. ", 37 The district court praised the opinion in
Mills Music as "a thoughtful examination of the 1909 [Copyright] Act and the recent
Supreme Court opinions concerning the Eleventh Amendment....
Although there were cases decided prior to Atascadero that dealt directly with
the issue of eleventh amendment immunity to copyright infringement actions, the
divergence in the results was significantly narrowed in later cases by the courts'
application of the Atascadero opinion to copyright infringement actions.
III. THE ATASCADERO DECISION
The relatively unexamined issue of state liability for copyright infringement
began to receive renewed attention in the wake of Justice Powell's opinion in
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon.39 In Atascadero, the plaintiff, Scanlon, sued
the Atascadero State Hospital and the California Department of Mental Health for
employment discrimination, alleging a violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973.40
In a five to four opinion, the Court held that "Congress must express its
intention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in unmistakable language in the
statute itself" 41 and "[a] general authorization for suit in federal court is not the kind
of unequivocal statutory language sufficient to abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment.'"42 Further, the Court refused to adopt the reasoning advanced by the
Ninth Circuit in Mills Music that states can consent to be sued43 by voluntarily
34. Id. at 322.
35. Mills Music was decided under the 1909 Copyright Act which used the term "any person." See ch. 320, 35
Stat. 1075 (1909). In contrast, the Johnson court was faced with interpreting the 1976 Copyright Act, which uses the term
"anyone." See 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
Comparing the two copyright statutes, the Johnson court stated that "the 1976 Copyright Act is at least as sweeping,
and probably more sweeping, than the language of the 1909 Act ... " Johnson, 606 F. Supp. at 324.
36. Johnson, 606 F.Supp. at 323.
37. Id. at n.1.
38. Id. at 323.
39. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
40. Id. at 236.
41. Id. at 243.
42. Id. at 246.
43. Mills Music v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278, 1286 (9th Cir. 1979).
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participating in federally sponsored programs. 44 Because the Rehabilitation Act did
not "evince an unmistakable congressional purpose," 45 the Court held that federal
courts lacked jurisdiction to entertain suits brought under the Rehabilitation Act
against state actors by the operation of the eleventh amendment. 46
Recent lower court opinions, when addressing the issue of eleventh amendment
immunity to copyright infringement actions, have focused on the "unmistakable
language in the statute itself"-47 requirement of Atascadero. Equating their failure to
find the 1976 Act's language "unmistakable" with the failure of the Court to find
unmistakability in the language of the Rehabilitation Act, the lower courts have
interpreted Atascadero as justifying dismissal of copyright infringement suits against
state actors.
48
IV. IMMUNITY TO COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT ACTIONS AFTER ATASCADERO
A. The Recent Cases
While the courts in Wihtol and Mills Music, both decided before Atascadero,
differed in their analysis and result, the cases decided after Atascadero have been
virtually unanimous in their application of the Atascadero test to deny abrogation of
the states' eleventh amendment immunity under the 1976 Act.
Decided almost immediately after Atascadero, Cardinal Industries v. Anderson
Parrish Association49 involved the alleged infringement of copyrighted architectural
plans by the University of South Florida 50 The State of Florida raised the eleventh
amendment as a defense. 5' The district court, without discussing the Atascadero
opinion, the conflicting case law, or the statutes that it claimed to have reviewed, 52
held that the state had not waived its immunity and that the immunity had not been
abrogated by Congress.5 3 The state's motion to dismiss was, therefore, granted by the
court. 54 The decision was later affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit without discussion. 55
The Atascadero test was first applied to a copyright infringement action in
Woelffer v. Happy States of America, Inc. 56 In Woelffer, The Illinois Department of
44. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 247.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 243.
48. See, e.g., BV Eng'g v. University of Cal., Los Angeles, 858 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1988).
49. No. 83-1038-Civ-T-13, slip op. (M.D. Fla. Sept. 6, 1985), aff'd, No. 86-3354, slip op. (I1th Cir. Jan. 27,
1987) (per curiam) (as cited in Note, Copyright Infringement and the Eleventh Amendment: A Doctrine of Unfair Use?,
40 VAD. L. REv. 225, 251 n.196 (1987)).
50. See Brief of Appellant, at 2, Cardinal Indus. v. Anderson Parrish Ass'n, No. 86-3354, slip op. (11th Cir. Jan.
27, 1987) (as cited in Note, Copyright Infringement and the Eleventh Amendment: A Doctrine of Unfair Use?, 40 V AmD.
L. REv. 225, 251 n.197 (1987)).
51. Cardinal Indus. v. Anderson Parrish Ass'n, No. 83-1038-Civ-T-13, slip op. at 2-3 (M.D. Fla. 1985) (as cited
in Note, Copyright Infringement and the Eleventh Amendment: A Doctrine of Unfair Use?, 40 V AND. L. REv. 225, 252
(1987)).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 5.
54. Id.
55. Cardinal Indlus. v. Anderson Parrish Ass'n, No. 86-3354, slip op. (lth Cir. Jan. 27, 1987), cert. denied,
Cardinal Indus., Inc. v. King, 108 S. Ct. 88 (1987).
56. 626 F. Supp. 499 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
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Commerce and Community Affairs (DCCA) brought a declaratory judgment action
seeking a declaration that its advertising slogan did not violate the copyright owned
by Happy States. 57 Happy States answered by filing a counterclaim for copyright
infringement and sought both monetary and injunctive relief. 58 DCCA raised the
eleventh amendment as a defense to the counterclaim. 59
The district court first determined that DCCA had partially waived its eleventh
amendment immunity by initiating the action itself in federal court. 60 However, after
a brief and less than clear discussion, the district court held that this waiver was not
sufficient to allow either monetary damages or an injunction from further
infringement. 61
The district court then discussed the argument raised by Happy States that by
enacting the 1976 Act, Congress had abrogated eleventh amendment immunity to
copyright infringement actions. 62 Admitting that the sweeping language of the 1976
Act "arguably includes states within the class of copyright and trademark
infringers," 63 the district court nonetheless held that under the "watershed principle
enunciated in Atascadero," 64 the broad language of the 1976 Act alone was "not
enough to abrogate sovereign immunity.' '65 Borrowing heavily from the language in
Atascadero, the district court held that in enacting the 1976 Act, Congress failed to
"express its intention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in unmistakable language
in the statutes themselves .... ",66
Richard Anderson Photography v. Radford University67 was the next occasion
when a court used the Atascadero test to deny abrogation under the 1976 Act. The
state actor in Anderson was a Virginia public university. 68 The plaintiff, Anderson,
brought suit against Radford alleging infringement of the copyrights in several
photographs owned by Anderson. 69
In Anderson, the district court eliminated the issue of congressional intent from
its consideration by holding that "Congress does not have the power to abrogate
States' Eleventh Amendment immunity without their consent unless it acts pursuant
to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.''70 Because the 1976 Act had been enacted
57. Id. at 501.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 502.
61. Id. at 503.
62. Id. at 503-05.




67. 633 F. Supp. 1154 (W.D. Va. 1986).
68. Id. at 1155.
69. Id. at 1156.
70. Id. at 1158. The fourteenth amendment provides:
1. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of the citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law;
5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV.
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under Congress' article I powers, and not under its fourteenth amendment powers, the
court concluded that it was unnecessary to examine the congressional intent behind
the 1976 Act and instead focused its discussion on the issue of a waiver of immunity
by Virginia. 7' Although this limitation of Congress' article I powers can be inferred
from Atascadero,72 other courts have not been so readily disposed to seize upon this
inference as the sole basis of their holdings. 73
The district court, finding no evidence of an express waiver,74 was not willing
to imply a waiver. 75 Although the district court found the argument advanced in Mills
Music and Johnson persuasive, it held that the Atascadero test demanded an
"unequivocal indication" of consent to suit in federal court. 76 Having found no such
indication, the district court dismissed the action. 77
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
dismissal of the suit, but took a different approach. 78 Focusing on the language of the
1976 Act, the Fourth Circuit, strictly construing Atascadero, held that the language
of the 1976 Act does not "clearly and unequivocally indicate Congress' intent to
create a cause of action ... enforceable against the states in federal court .... 179
In BV Engineering v. University of California, Los Angeles,80 the plaintiff
alleged infringement of seven copyrighted software programs and associated docu-
ments owned by BV. 8' As a defense, UCLA raised eleventh amendment immunity. 82
Approaching the question of immunity to copyright infringement actions from a
different perspective than that of the court in Anderson,83 the district court in BV
Engineering concluded that Congress "may abrogate the state's immunity to suit
pursuant to any of its plenary powers." 84 Under this interpretation of congressional
power, the district court was free to look for either a waiver of immunity by the state,
or an indication of congressional intent to abrogate the state's immunity in the 1976
Act.
Although agreeing with the logic of the Mills Music decision that congressional
intent to abrogate the eleventh amendment immunity is implicit in the 1976 Act, the
district court held that the "emphatic" 85 demand in the Atascadero opinion for an
71. Anderson, 633 F. Supp. at 1158-60.
72. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 247 (1985) ("[W]e have decided today that the
Rehabilitation Act does not evince an unmistakable congressional purpose, pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
to subject unconsenting States to the jurisdiction of the federal courts.").
73. See, e.g., infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
74. Anderson, 633 F. Supp. at 1159.
75. Id. at 1160.
76. Id. at 1159 (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 n.1 (1985)).
77. Id. at 1161.
78. Richard Anderson Photo. v. Brown, 852 F.2d 114, 116-22 (4th Cir. 1988).
79. Id. at 120.
80. 657 F. Supp. 1246 (C.D. Cal. 1987), aff'd, 858 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1988).
81. Id. at 1247.
82. Id.
83. Richard Anderson Photo. v. Radford Univ., 633 F. Supp. 1154 (W.D. Va. 1986).
84. BVEng'g, 657 F. Supp. at 1248 (quoting In re MeVey Trucking, 812 F.2d 311, 323 (7th Cir. 1987)).
85. Id. at 1250.
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express statement of congressional intent to abrogate the eleventh amendment
immunity in the statute itself demanded dismissal of the suit. 86
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court. Stating that the
Supreme Court had issued a "mandate" that the eleventh amendment immunity be
abrogated only when "Congress has included in the statute unequivocal and specific
language indicating an intent to subject states to suit in federal court," '87 the Ninth
Circuit concluded that Mills Music had been overruled. 88
In the most recent case to address the question of eleventh amendment immunity
to copyright infringement actions, Lane v. First National Bank of Boston,89 the
plaintiff brought suit against the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, alleging infringe-
ment of her copyright in a computerized data base. 90 The Commonwealth filed a
motion for summary judgment based in part on the defense of eleventh amendment
immunity. 91
The district court held that the 1976 Act failed to provide the "unmistakable
language required by Atascadero."9 2 However, the district court focused solely upon
the term "anyone" as used in the 1976 Act 93 and found the term "insufficient to
include the Commonwealth.' 94
B. Summary of the Recent Cases
While the recent cases have been uniform in their application of the eleventh
amendment immunity to bar copyright infringement actions against state actors, their
reasoning has varied. Both the district court in BV Engineering and the Woelffer court
held that the language of the 1976 Act was broad enough to include the individual
states within its scope, and hence, abrogate the eleventh amendment immunity. 95
However, both courts further held that the provisions of the 1976 Act were not
specific enough to withstand the Atascadero test for abrogation. 96 On the other hand,
the district court in Anderson held that the Atascadero opinion recognized congres-
sional abrogation of the eleventh amendment immunity only when Congress
specifically acts under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. 97 Because the 1976
86. Id. at 1250-51.
87. BV Eng'g v. University of Cal., Los Angeles, 858 F.2d 1394, 1400 (9th Cir. 1988).
88. Id. at 1397 n.1.
89. 687 F. Supp. 11 (D. Mass. 1988).
90. Id. at 13.
91. Id. at 12.
92. Id. at 14-15.
93. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1982) ("anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner..
94. Lane, 687 F. Supp. at 14.
95. "In the copyright, trademark, and patent area, it seems reasonable that an intention to bind the States should
be implied .. " BV Eng'g v. University of Cal., Los Angeles, 657 F. Supp. 1246, 1250 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
"The sweeping language employed by Congress arguably includes states within the class of copyright and trademark
infringers." Woelffer v. Happy States of Am., 626 F. Supp. 499, 504 (N.D. II1. 1985).
96. "[IThe necessary unequivocal expression of congressional intent within the language of the statute ... is not
present .... BV Eng'g, 657 F. Supp. at 1250.
"The general authorization for suit in federal court against 'anyone' who infringes a copyright . . . is not the
kind of unequivocal statutory language sufficient to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment." Woelffer, 626 F. Supp. at 504
(referring to 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1982)).
97. "The Eleventh Amendment also does not bar suits against the States when... Congress, acting pursuant to
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Act was enacted pursuant to Congress' article I powers, the Anderson court
concluded that there could not have been abrogation, even assuming congressional
intent to abrogate. 98
V. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT'S RESTRICTION ON ARTICLE I POWER
A. The Conflict
Before any discussion of congressional abrogation of the states' eleventh
amendment immunity to copyright infringement actions can begin, a more funda-
mental question must be resolved. The Atascadero opinion implies,99 and at least one
commentator supports, 0 0 the theory that the eleventh amendment acts as a restriction
upon the power granted to Congress in article I of the Constitution.10 1 If this theory
is correct, then Congress can only abrogate the states' immunity by acting pursuant
to its power under the fourteenth amendment, and not under its article I power.
Therefore, a conflict exists between the eleventh amendment and Congress'
article I power. The 1976 Act was enacted under Congress' article I powers. 10 2 If
these powers are ineffective in abrogating the states' eleventh amendment immunity,
further discussion of congressional abrogation is moot and future cases must focus
solely upon an express waiver by the state, 0 3 as was the court's analysis in
Anderson. l04
B. The Distinction Between Fourteenth Amendment Power and Article I Power
The Atascadero opinion recognized that Congress, pursuant to section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment, could abrogate the states' eleventh amendment immunity to
suit in federal court.10 5 In order to recognize abrogation under the fourteenth
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, has abrogated the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity. Richard
Anderson Photo. v. Radford Univ., 633 F. Supp. 1154, 1156 (W.D. Va. 1986).
98. "[The issue in this case turns not on whether Congress has abrogated the States' immunity, but on whether
Virginia has waived it." Id. at 1158. But see Richard Anderson Photo. v. Brown, 852 F.2d 114, 117 (4th Cir. 1988)
(refusing to address the abrogation issue).
99. "The Eleventh Amendment is 'necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment ... ' Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985) (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427
U.S. 445, 456 (1976)).
100. See Note, Copyright Infringement and the Eleventh Amendment: A Doctrine of Unfair Use?, 40 VANr. L. REv.
225 (1987).
101. "Congress, acting pursuant to the copyright and patent clause, has no power to unilaterally abrogate a state's
eleventh amendment immunity." Id. at 265.
In County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985), the Court was faced with the issue of whether
Congress can abrogate the states' eleventh amendment immunity under its article I power. The Court, however, disposed
of the case without reaching the eleventh amendment question. Id. at 252.
102. 'when enacting the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress was specifically acting pursuant to its power "[t]o...
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
103. "State consent, expressed or implied, remains a necessary ingredient to nullify constitutional immunity in
infringement cases." See Note, supra note 100, at 265-66.
104. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 99.
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amendment, but deny abrogation under article I, there must be some constitutional
basis for the distinction. ' 0 6
There are two possible bases for distinguishing between Congress' article I
power and its power under the fourteenth amendment. The first basis is that the
fourteenth amendment repealed some limitation of power that the eleventh amend-
ment placed on Congress. The argument is that the eleventh amendment restricted
Congress' article I powers, but that some of these restrictions were subsequently
repealed by the fourteenth amendment.10 7 This limited repeal of eleventh amendment
restrictions would explain why congressional abrogation of eleventh amendment
immunity is allowed under the fourteenth amendment, but denied under article I.
The second basis for the distinction between fourteenth amendment power and
article I power is that the fourteenth amendment gave Congress an additional grant of
power greater than that contemplated under article 1.108 The fourteenth amendment's
additional grant of power, therefore, is sufficient to overcome eleventh amendment
restrictions, while the lesser grant of power under article I remains subservient to the
eleventh amendment.
With these two bases for distinguishing between Congress' fourteenth amend-
ment power and its article I power isolated, it is possible to examine each one
individually in order to determine if either is constitutionally sufficient to support
such a distinction. If neither basis has constitutional support, then a distinction
between Congress' fourteenth amendment power and its article I power cannot stand.
A failure to make such a distinction must result in the conclusion that Congress can
abrogate the states' eleventh amendment immunity pursuant to any of its plenary
grants of power.
C. The Fourteenth Amendment as a Repeal of Eleventh Amendment Limitations
In order to conclude that the fourteenth amendment repealed some eleventh
amendment limitation on congressional power, an eleventh amendment limitation of
congressional power must first be established. If no such limitation exists, there is
nothing for the fourteenth amendment to repeal.
An examination of both the text and the history indicate no intention of limiting
congressional power by the ratification of the eleventh amendment. 0 9 The primary
motivation behind the eleventh amendment was the desire to overrule the Supreme
Court holding in Chisholm v. Georgia.'10 The desire to overrule Chisholm has been
recognized by the Supreme Court. 11 The language of the amendment itself supports
106. See In re McVey Trucking, 812 F.2d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 1987).
107. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 519 F.2d 559, 569 (2d Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 427 U.S. 445
(1976). See also Note, Congressional Abrogation of State Sovereign Immunity, 86 CoLum. L. Rzv. 1436, 1442 (1986).
108. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). See also Note, supra note 107, at 1442.
109. See McVey Trucking, 812 F.2d at 317 (discussing the motivation behind the adoption of the eleventh
amendment).
110. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). In this case, the Court assumed original jurisdiction in a private suit brought by
a citizen of South Carolina against the State of Georgia.
111. See Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (The Court stated that "the [eleventh]
Amendment's language overruled the particular result in Chisholm .. "). Id. at 98.
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the conclusion that the eleventh amendment was meant to overrule Chisholm. 112 The
framers chose the word "construe" 11 3 because "they wanted to limit the branch
charged with 'construing' the Constitution-the judiciary.""' 4 In addition, the
eleventh amendment is specifically addressed to "[t]he Judicial Power of the United
States. 11 5 No mention whatsoever is made regarding the effect of the eleventh
amendment upon congressional power.
The conclusion to be drawn from the examination of the history and text of the
eleventh amendment, as well as Supreme Court precedent, is that the eleventh
amendment did not have the effect of placing any limitation on congressional power
under article 1.116 Because the eleventh amendment never placed any limitation on
congressional power, there can be no limitations for the fourteenth amendment to
repeal. 117 Therefore, an analysis of this basis for making a distinction between
Congress' fourteenth amendment power and its article I power does not support
making such a distinction.
D. The Fourteenth Amendment as a Greater Grant of Power Than Article I
Under the theory that the fourteenth amendment and article I are both plenary
grants of congressional power, 118 if the fourteenth amendment gave Congress the
authority to abrogate the states' eleventh amendment immunity, then Congress must
also have that authority under its article I powers. 119 The Supreme Court, in
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,120 however, saw a distinction between the fourteenth amend-
ment and other grants of plenary power. The Court stated: "Congress may ... for
the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for
private suits against States, or state officials which are constitutionally impermissible
in other contexts."' 2'1 Unfortunately, the Court provided no further guidance as to
those situations in which congressional action would be constitutionally impermis-
sible. However, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 122 the
Court did discuss Congress' authority under article I to impose an obligation on a
state despite sovereign immunity.
112. U.S. CoNsT. amend. X1, supra note 10.
113. Id.
114. McVey Trucking, 812 F.2d at 317.
115. U.S. CoNsr. amend. Xl, supra note 10.
116. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985). Justice Brennan, arguing in dissent, stated:
The language of the Eleventh Amendment, its legislative history, and the attendant historic circumstances
all strongly suggest that the Amendment was intended to remedy an interpretation of the Constitution that
would have had the... diversity clauses of Article III abrogating the state law of sovereign immunity on
state-law c uses of action brought in federal courts.
Id. at 289 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
117. See McVey Trucking, 812 F.2d at 316-19 (specifically rejecting the "repeal" analysis); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,
519 F.2d 559, 569 (2d Cir. 1975) (rejecting the theory that the fourteenth amendment modified the eleventh amendment).
118. "[B]oth Article I and the Fourteenth Amendment are plenary grants of power .. ." McVey Trucking, 812 F.2d
at 319.
119. Id. at 319.
120. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
121. Id. at 456.
122. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Although the case dealt with the tenth amendment, the underlying logic concerning
abrogation of state sovereignty applies equally to abrogation of immunity under the eleventh amendment.
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The Court in Garcia recognized that the states retain some sovereign immunity,
but not total immunity. The states, the Court noted, retain immunity "only to the
extent that the Constitution has not divested them of their original powers and
transferred those powers to the Federal Government."'123 The Court further stated
that the "states remain sovereign as to all powers not vested in Congress or denied
them by the Constitution."'' 24 The test under Garcia for congressional power to
abrogate the states' immunity, therefore, becomes "simply whether the Constitution
has 'divested [the states] of their original powers and transferred those powers to the
Federal Government.'"125 Because "the Constitution does not carve out express
elements of state sovereign immunity that Congress may not employ its delegated
powers to displace," 1 26 once Congress has been delegated a specific power, the states
may not escape the exercise of that power by claiming sovereign immunity. This
conclusion is in accord with a previous statement by the Court: "By empowering
Congress to regulate . . . .the States necessarily surrendered any portion of their
sovereignty that would stand in the way of such regulation." 127
The Court in Garcia did express concern over federal intrusion into state
sovereignty. 128 Nevertheless, the Court ultimately concluded that the "[s]tate[s']
sovereign interests .. .are more properly protected by the procedural safeguards
inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially created limitations on
federal power."' 129 The language chosen by the Court indicates that the Court
considers the political system as the primary method available to the states to limit
federal intrusion into state sovereignty, not the judiciary. In addition, lower courts are
directed to refrain from setting artificial limits on congressional power in the interest
of state sovereignty.
In light of the Garcia test, the theory that the fourteenth amendment granted
Congress greater power than article I cannot stand. Congress may, when acting
pursuant to its article I power, "exercise [that power]," even though it will "interfere
with the laws, or even the Constitution of the State."' ' 30 Therefore, a distinction
between the fourteenth amendment power and article I power cannot be supported by
the theory that the fourteenth amendment was a greater grant of congressional power
than article 1.131
123. Id. at 549.
124. Id. at 550. The Court also recognized that "[s]ection 8 of [article I] works as [a] ... sharp contraction of state
sovereignty by authorizing Congress to exercise a wide range of legislative powers . I. " d. at 548.
125. In re McVey Trucking, 812 F.2d 311, 320 (7th Cir. 1987) (quoting Gareia v. San Antonio Metro. Transp.
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 549 (1985)).
126. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550.
127. Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
128. "T]he States occupy a special position in our constitutional system .. " Garcia, 469 U.S. at 547.
129. Id. at 552. The Court was also influenced by the inherent limitations placed on Congress' article I power due
to the delegated nature of that power. Id. at 550.
130. 2 Annals of Cong. 1897 (1791) (quoting J. Madison).
131. -[T]he Constitution of the United States, with the several amendments thereof, must be regarded as one
instrument, all of whose provisions are to be deemed of equal validity." Prout v. Starr, 188 U.S. 537, 543 (1903).
In a case decided shortly after Atascadero, the Court refused to limit the power of Congress to abrogate the eleventh
amendment immunity, stating: "Congress [can]... pursuant to a valid exercise ofpower... abrogate immunity." Green
v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (emphasis added).
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E. The Effect of the Eleventh Amendment Upon Judicial Power
Having determined that there is no basis for distinguishing between Congress'
article I power and its power under the fourteenth amendment, the possible
limitations that the eleventh amendment may have placed upon the federal juduciary
must now be examined. The examination is necessary because even if Congress has
the power to abrogate the states' eleventh amendment immunity, the power is of little
use if the federal courts are unable to enforce congressional acts which may impinge
on the states' sovereignty.
Such a broad reading of the eleventh amendment, the effect of which would be
to totally prohibit the federal courts from enforcing congressional acts that might
conflict with state sovereignty, is not warranted. 132 The eleventh amendment has not
been interpreted as preventing a federal court from issuing enforceable orders that
affect a sovereign state. 133 In addition, when acting under the fourteenth amendment,
Congress can require the federal courts to impose monetary damages upon an
unconsenting sovereign state. 134 Because the fourteenth amendment makes no
express grant of additional power to the judiciary, 135 the power of the federal courts
to enforce congressional acts under the fourteenth amendment must be implied. 136 As
discussed above, no constitutional basis can be supported for a distinction between
Congress' fourteenth amendment power and its power under article I. Therefore,
there can be no constitutional basis for implying judicial power under the fourteenth
amendment and refusing to imply judicial power under article 1. 137
The conclusion to be drawn from an analysis of congressional ability to abrogate
the states' eleventh amendment immunity, either under the fourteenth amendment or
under article I, is that the eleventh amendment does not prevent Congress from
abrogating the states' eleventh amendment immunity when Congress acts pursuant to
its article I powers. Further, when Congress has so abrogated the states' immunity,
the eleventh amendment does not prevent the federal courts from enforcing the intent
of Congress against an unconsenting state. 138
The lack of a distinction between Congress' article I power and its power under the fourteenth amendment is
particularly evident in the patent and copyright area. The Court has stated:
[U]nder the Constitution, Congress has power 'to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing
for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries,' and
to make all laws which may be necessary and proper for carrying that express power into execution ....
United States v. Duell, 172 U.S. 576, 583 (1899) (quoting the Patent and Copyright Clause, supra note 1).
132. See In re MeVey Trucking, 812 F.2d 311, 321-22 (7th Cir. 1987).
133. See, e.g., Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670 (1982) (federal courts may enjoin a
state where the state's officers have acted without state authority); Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565 (1947) (federal
bankruptcy court could void a tax lien held by the state); Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (federal courts may enjoin
a state from violating the constitutional rights of its citizens).
134. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456-57 (1976).
135. "The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 5 (emphasis added). See supra note 70.
136. McVey Trucking, 812 F.2d at 323.
137. "If Congress acting within its Article I or other powers creates a legal right and remedy,... then Congress
may entrust adjudication of claims based on the newly created right to the federal courts-even if the defendant is a
State." Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 290 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
138. Id.
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VI. CONGRESSIONAL ABROGATION OF ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY
A. The Atascadero Test
Prior to the Atascadero opinion, the normal method of interpreting congressional
intent, when not expressly stated on the face of the statute, was to look at the statute
together with its legislative history. 139 However, the Court's statement in Atascadero
that "Congress must express its intention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in
unmistakable language in the statute itself," 140 indicates that the lower courts are not
permitted to look beyond the face of the statute itself for guidance.
A strict reading of this "face of the statute" language would prohibit the lower
courts from seeking any guidance as to the intent of Congress from a statute's
legislative history, or the opinions of other tribunals. 141 A lower court must dismiss
an action against a state actor if the language of the particular statute in question could
be construed as having more than one possible interpretation. 142 As an unchallengable
defense, a guilty state need only allude to a statute's lack of "unmistakability" in
order to escape the statute's reach. As a result, it will be extremely difficult for
Congress to abrogate the states' eleventh amendment immunity. 143 In addition, the
federal courts would be put in the difficult position of ignoring the clear statutory
intentions of Congress, as expressed in the legislative history of the act, because of
less than clear language. 144 Such a result is undesirable, especially in a democratic
system in which the actual language of a statute is more an exercise in the art of
compromise than it is a test of linguistic skill.
Not only is a strict "face of the statute" interpretation of Atascadero an
undesirable result, it is not, as suggested by some courts, 45 compelled by the
language of the opinion. A closer reading of the opinion highlights Justice Powell's
underlying emphasis on certainty. Rather than mandating a specific statutory
construction method, the opinion instead emphasizes that the federal courts must be
"certain of Congress' intent before finding that federal law overrides the guarantees
of the Eleventh Amendment.' 1 46 It was Justice Powell's belief that by requiring
Congress to express its intention in the statute itself, the courts could "ensure such
certainty."1 "47
In addition, Justice Powell was concerned with the expansion of the jurisdiction
of the federal judiciary. Justice Powell stated that it was "appropriate" for the federal
139. McVey Trucking, 812 F.2d at 323.
140. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 243.
141. McVey Trucking, 812 F.2d at 324.
142. Id.
143. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 254-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
144. Id.
145. See, e.g., BV Eng'g v. University of Cal., Los Angeles, 657 F. Supp. 1246, 1250 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Richard
Anderson Photo. v. Radford Univ., 633 F. Supp. 1154, 1159 (W.D. Va. 1986), aff'd sub noma., Richard Anderson Photo.
v. Brown, 852 F.2d 114 (4th Cir. 1988).
146. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 243.
147. Id.
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courts to rely "only on the clearest intentions... that Congress has enhanced our
power. ' 14 8
The Atascadero opinion, therefore, did not mandate a specific form of statutory
construction. Rather, it used a particular form of statutory construction as prima facie
evidence of congressional intent. If the congressional intent behind a statute is
evidenced in such a way that "ensure[s] ... certainty," 149 then express language on
the face of the statute is not required. 150 The federal courts can, therefore, permissibly
look beyond the four corners of the statute itself in order to determine Congress'
intent to abrogate the states' eleventh amendment immunity. 151 Looking beyond the
statute itself is in accord with the Supreme Court practice of relying upon legislative
history when interpreting a statute, t52 and with a perceived retreat on this subject by
the Court in an opinion issued subsequent to Atascadero, in which the Court made no
mention of a "face of the statute" requirement. 53
Finally, it cannot be overlooked that the overall goal of the federal courts when
interpreting statutes is to "give effect to the intentions of Congress.'1 54 Failure to
look to a statute's legislative history can inhibit this goal,155 even when the legislative
history shows evidence of mixed motivations. While express language in the statute
itself may provide the Court's requisite certainty, the federal courts should not
hesitate to look beyond the face of the statute for guidance in its interpretation when
the language of the statute itself cannot ensure certainty. If the court can be certain
of Congress' intent, whether by reading the statute itself, or by an expression of intent
in the statute's legislative history, the court is "duty-bound to give effect to that
desire." 1 5 6
B. The Search for Certainty
In the most recent cases of copyright infringement brought against state actors,
the lower federal courts have refused to look beyond the face of the 1976 Act in order
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. In re McVey Trucking, 812 F.2d 311, 324-25 (7th Cir. 1987).
151. Id.
152. In Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979), the Court looked first to the language of the statute. Having found
no explicit language indicating an intent to abrogate the state's immunity, the Court then looked to the statute's legislative
history. An important factor in the Court's analysis was a lack of any "history which focuses directly on the question of
state liability .. .- Id. at 345.
Similarly, the legislative history of the statute in question was heavily relied upon by the Court in Hutto v. Finney,
437 U.S. 678 (1978). Stating that the "legislative history [was] . . . plain," the Court was certain of Congress' intent
to abrogate the state's immunity. Id. at 694.
153. In Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 (1985), the Court stated that the eleventh amendment prevents the states
from being sued in federal courts unless "they consent to [suit] in unequivocal terms or unless Congress, pursuant to a
valid execise of power, unequivocally expresses its intent to abrogate immunity." Id. at 68.
The language in Green makes no mention of the Atascadero desire that congressional intent be expressed on the face
of the statute in order to be effective. While this could be interpreted as a retreat by the Court in Green from the strict
Atascadero language, it also further confirms the fact that the Court is emphasizing certainty rather than a method of
statutory construction.
154. United States v. American Trucking, 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1940).
155. "If the Court... fails to implement the plain intent of Congress, it upsets another fundamental constitutional
balance: the balance between the legislature and the judiciary." Note, supra note 107, at 1448.
156. In re MeVey Trucking, 812 F.2d 311, 326 (7th Cir. 1987).
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to ascertain the true intentions of Congress. This refusal to do so was the result of an
overly restrictive reading of the Atascadero opinion. 157 While the language of the
1976 Act does not contain any specific phrase indicating that Congress meant to
include the states within the 1976 Act's reach, failure to look at the statute as a whole
results in an incorrect conclusion of congressional intent.
An examination of the entire body of the 1976 Act uncovers numerous express
exemptions of state activities. 158 Although some of these express exemptions refer to
the rather generic term "governmental body," 159 at least two exemptions specifically
address "any State." 160 If Congress had thought it necessary to carve out exemptions
for state actors, it could only have been because Congress meant the individual states
to be within reach of the 1976 Act.161 While Congress stopped short of specifically
stating that the individual states were subject to the 1976 Act, logic compels the
conclusion that Congress wanted to make the states subject to the 1976 Act and
thought it was doing so. The lower courts' insistence on a specific, undefined phrase
or catchword is unwarranted in light of the clear, express signal of congressional
intent on the face of the 1976 Act. In fact, the Ninth Circuit found this very argument
"compelling," yet still felt "constrained by the [Atascadero] mandate."' 162
In addition to clear language of congressional intent on the face of the 1976 Act
itself, 163 the legislative history is filled with examples indicating that Congress
intended the 1976 Act to reach the states. 164 In particular, specific exemptions for
state fairs and state educational activities were debated on the floor of the House. 165
The legislative history clearly indicates that the specific state exemptions were not
accidental. Congress thought these state exemptions were necessary so that the states
could escape liability for copyright infringement. Logic compels the conclusion that
Congress, at the very least, thought that the states were subject to the 1976 Act.
Despite the clear indications of congressional intent in both the statute itself, and
in the legislative history of the 1976 Act, the lower courts' reading of the Atascadero
opinion forced them to dismiss the actions before them. The lower courts' willingness
to uphold the states' eleventh amendment immunity defense indicates a failure to look
157. See cases cited supra notes 56-94 and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 107, 110(2), 110(6), 110(8), 111(a)(4), 112(b)(3), 112(c), 112(d), 118(d)(3),
601(b)(3), 602(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
159. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982) (generally describing "classroom use" as a noninfringing fair use); 17
U.S.C. § 110(2) (1982) (exempting performance of nondramatic literal or musical works when part of the "instructional
activities of a governmental body"); 17 U.S.C. § 110(6) (1982) (exempting performance of nondramatic musical works
by a "governmental body"); 17 U.S.C. § Ill(a)(4) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (exempting secondary transmissions by a
"governmental body"); 17 U.S.C. § 112(b)(3) (1982) (exempting recordings made by a "governmental body"); 17
U.S.C. § 118(d)(3) (1982) (exempting reproductions made by a "governmental body").
160. 17 U.S.C. § 601(b)(3) (1982) (exempting importation of copyrighted works by "any State or political
subdivision of a State"); 17 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1982) (exempting "any State or political subdivision of a State").
161. See Note, supra note 100, at 261.
162. BV Eng'g v. University of Cal., Los Angeles, 858 F.2d 1394, 1400 (9th Cir. 1988).
163. See supra notes 158-59.
164. See, e.g., 113 CONG. R c. 8590 (1967) (remarks of Rep. Nelson discussing the need for an exemption for state
and county fairs); 113 CoNG. REc. 8612 (1967) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier discussing an exemption for state and local
school systems); 113 CoNG. Rrc. 8617 (1967) (remarks of Rep. Morris discussing the discriminating effect a proposed
amendment to the 1909 Act would have on geographically smaller states).
165. Id.
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at the 1976 Act as a whole, and applies an overly restrictive interpretation of
Atascadero.
VII. FEDERAL PREEMPTION
In Atascadero, the Court wished to buttress the sovereignty of the states against
the gradual encroachment of federal power. Instead, the lower courts have interpreted
Atascadero so as to remove any obstacles that stood between a federally protected
property right and the theft of that property by state actors.
Unlike other federal legislation that either gives rise to both federal and state
causes of action, 166 or a federal cause of action that exists in conjunction with a state
cause of action, 167 a copyright owner has only one forum available, the federal
courts.168 If the federal courts refuse to entertain a copyright infringement suit, there
is no alternative court to which the copyright owner can plead for relief. The Ninth
Circuit acknowledged this unfair result, stating: "We recognize that our holding will
allow states to violate the federal copyright laws with virtual impunity." 169
Compounding the copyright owner's difficulties is the fact that the 1976 Act
preempts any action predicated on state copyright law. 170 Although the eleventh
amendment does not bar suits against a state in that state's courts, there no longer is
any substantive state law cause of action upon which relief can be granted. 171
The result of this unique combination of circumstances is that the copyright
owner must go to federal court to seek relief. If the federal courts refuse to entertain
infringement suits against state actors, the copyright owner has no way to enforce a
property right granted by Congress and specifically authorized by the Constitution. 172
To deny an injured party a remedy is unfair, especially when the denial is caused by
a rule of statutory construction that the federal courts have imposed upon
themselves. 173 The Court has recognized that reading a "sovereign immunity
exception" into a statute that preempted suits in state courts would result in a "right
without a remedy."1 74 The Court was, therefore, "unwilling to conclude that
Congress intended so pointless and frustrating a result."1 75
166. See, e.g., Flagship Real Estate v. Flagship Banks, 374 So. 2d 1020, 1021 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (The state
court found concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts in a trademark infringement action.).
167. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 301(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (allowing state copyright actions that are not within
the subject matter of federal copyright law).
168. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1982 & Supp.IV 1986) (conferring original jurisdiction of copyright actions in the
federal courts and specifically excluding state court jurisdiction). See also 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)
(preempting state copyright protection).
169. BV Eng'g v. University of Cal., Los Angeles, 858 F.2d 1394, 1400 (9th Cir. 1988).
170. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
171. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964) ("IThe patent and copyright] laws,
like other laws of the United States enacted pursuant to constitutional authority, are the supreme law of the land."). See
also 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (stating that the federal copyright laws preempt both common law and
state copyright law.). But see 17 U.S.C. § 301(b) (1982) (allowing certain forms of state copyright protection).
172. U.S. CoxsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
173. "[T]he Court has put in place special rules of statutory draftsmanship that Congress must obey before the Court
will accord recognition to its act." Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 253-54 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
174. Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 190 (1964).
175. Id.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Despite an inference to the contrary in Atascadero, there is no basis for a
distinction between Congress' power to abrogate the states' eleventh amendment
immunity under the fourteenth amendment and Congress' power to abrogate the
states' immunity under article I. Before entertaining any suit against an unconsenting
state, however, the federal courts must be certain of Congress' intent to hold the state
answerable in federal court. In order to determine congressional intent, the federal
courts are not limited to exploring the face of the statute itself for unequivocal
language, but must also look at the intent of the statute as a whole, as well as the
statute's legislative history.
The recent line of federal court decisions holding that an action for copyright
infringement cannot be maintained against a state actor apply an overly restrictive
interpretation of the Atascadero opinion that serves to frustrate the clear intention of
Congress to subject the individual states to the provisions of the Copyright Act of
1976. The lower courts, rather than looking at the 1976 Act as a whole and
considering its legislative history, adopt a myopic rule of statutory construction. By
their blind adherence to a self-imposed restriction, the lower courts are forced to
ignore any indications of congressional intent other than an undefined, unequivocal
expression. As a result, the clear intentions of Congress are being denied.
While the lower courts view their self-imposed restriction as championing the
sovereignty of the states, the fear of federal encroachment into state sovereignty is
misplaced as applied to the issue of copyright infringement. The power to issue letters
of copyright and protect the copyright owners has always been a federal power. As
a power vested in Congress, the states retain no sovereignty with respect to
copyrights. For the lower courts to now grant the states sovereignty ignores the
Constitution, the history of the eleventh amendment, and the express will of
Congress.
Jeffrey S. Schira*
* A previous draft of this Note was submitted to the 1988 Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition. The author
wishes to thank Professor David Shipley, Bernadette Bollas, and Philomena Dane for their helpful comments and
suggestions.
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